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SITUATION

I

CONTRABAND AND BLOCKADE
States X and Y are at war. Other states are neutral.
(a) State X declares that all distinction between conditional and absolute contraband is abolished and that
all goods bound for Y will be treated as contraband.
(b) State Y declares all ports of X blockaded and
Inail).tains a line 3 miles off the coast of state D to prevent vessels passing up the river Dana which is the sole
navigable ·wa.ter.,vay thrQugh state D to the capital of
state X.
What are the rights of the belligerents and of the
neutrals?
SOLUTION

(a) State X 1nay declare all distinction between absolute and conditional contraband abolished, but this does
not make all goods contraband nor does it give to state
X a right to treat all articles bound for Y as contraband.
(b) State Y n1ay not lawfully 1naintain a blockade of
the ports of state X to which there is access only through
a navigable river of neutral state D; nor may state Y
prevent vessels from entering the river Dana, though it
may seize vessels outside neutral jurisdiction when transporting prohibited goods having an ultimate enemy
destination.
NOTES

Earlier discussions of oontraband.-Contraband has
often been the subject of discussion at the Naval War
1
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College in past years. 1 From these discussions it will be
evident that opinions of different states have from time
to time changed. In general, though not in every case,
belligerents have been inclined to extend the list of contraband and neutrals ha~e en9-~avored to restrict the
list. vVhen the maintenanc~ , .P{ )?l_o~l~ade is easy, the
contraband list might be short; .and when blockade was
difficult or impossible, the list would be extended. The
idea of contraband is so old that there are many exaJ.IIlples
of diversity in practice.
Early attitude toward contraband.-The word contraband, Latin contrabandum, implied disregard of a decree or prohibition. The word was used in early times
in deferring to domestic restrict~ons usually upon trade
in named articles as in regard to trade in salt which often
was a government monopoly. Later prohibitions were
issued restricting within specified areas trade in materials "\vhich might be of use in war.
The prohibition on export of arms, an idea receiving
particular attention again in the twentieth century, was
common in Roman and Byzantine periods when it was
extended to supplies which might be serviceable to possible enemies. At times religious penalties were prescribed by the early church for those who furnished war
materials to infidels. In· these instances the measures
taken were domestic or applied to those under the authority of the source of the prohibitions and the prohibitions might be applied both in time of peace and in time
of war. l(ings of England in the fourteenth century issued prohibitions, sometimes in regard to furnishing
articles to nationals of named states and sometimes in
regard to furnishing specified articles to any foreigner.
England also made treaties in this century prohibiting
the supplying of speciyed articles under penalty of
forfeiture to the king (Edward III, 1370).
1 For references, s,e e General Index to' International Law Situations,
'I'opics, Dis:cussion~, Documents, and Decisions, Vols. I to XXX, 1901-30.
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Gradually the prohibitions aimed at regulating domestic trade began to extend to the activities of foreign mer- chants in time of war. This extension created the demand that for the security of traders the list of prohibited areas should be made known either by previous
treaty agreement or by special proclamation, and such
action beea1ne usilal from the seventeenth century. The
early enu1nerations 'vere not based on any uniform principle but 'vere often deter1nined by political or other
n1otives.
It was easy to extend the domestic prohibition of
furnishing certain goods to certain areas or to infidels
by analogy to the furnishing ,of such goods to enemies.
As belligerents would have no authority over acts
of traders within neutral jurisdiction, they began to
seize goods of the nature of contraband when these
were outside of the im1nediate control of the neutral
state, as in transit on the high sea. Here there would
be .a degree of conflict between the rights of the neutral to protect the shipping under its national flag and
the right of the belligerent to prevent the delivery to
his opponent of goods which might be used for his defeat or injury. 'rhe right of the belligerent w·as to a
degree gradually conceded as dominant over the right
of the neutral trader, and the belligerent assumed the
right to enumerate by procla1nation, or otherwise to
determine, what should be regarded as under the ban.
·The furnishing of contraband was, at first, regarded
as an act for which the state should be held respQnsible.
Gradually the problem of supplying of contraband by
subjects of neutral states gave rise to controversies. Attempts were made to extend to states responsibility for
acts of their subjects. The \ discussions of these topics
were often by theologians because prohibitions had been
against furnishing contraband to infidels and the course
of argumentation.· differed from modern discussions
t~ough involving like principles. This was especially
true o£ the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
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In a posthun1ous book o£ Gentilis (1552-1608), the
mingling of the 1nodern and earlier attitude is sho\vn.
The negative aspect o£ the Golden Rule " that one should
not do unto others \vhat he would not that they should
do to him" was emphasized. Gentilis quotes the civil
laws:
" Let no one have the power to transport wine, oil, or any
liquid to heathendonl even to give them a taste, to say nothing
ci' satisfying the demands of trade." "Let no one dare to sell
to alien heathen * * * coats of mail, shields, bows, arrows,.
broadswords, swords, or arms of any other sort whatsoever.
Let absolutely no weapons be retailed to them by anyone, and
no iron at all, whether already made up or not, for it would be
harmful to the Rmnan Empire, and would approach treason
to furnish the heathen, who ought to be without equiptnent, with
weapons to 1nake them stronger. But' if anyon~ shall have sold
any kind of arms anywhere to alien heathen of any nation whatsoever in violation of the interdicts of our holy religion, we
decree that all his goods be straightway confiscated, and that
he too suffer capital punish1nent." ( Gentilis, Hispanicae Advoca tionis, Bk. I, Chap. XX.)

Gentilis extends these principles in the sixteenth century and takes up many of the questions arising £rom
destination, proportion, and ownership of the cargo.
The neutral began to demand that the evidence that
the trade would be dangerous to the belligerent must
also be clear not only £rom the nature o£ the goods
themselves which might, if going to another neutral, be
innocent, but that the goods i£ liable to capture must
have an enemy destination. The nature o£ the goods
and the destination thus became early determining £actors in liability £or contraband.
Opinion of Grotius.-Grotius (1583-1645) in his
epoch-marking book, De jure belli ao pacis, 1625, looking
backward and surveying earli·ef.; prnctice_s;· said: .
But there often arises the question. 'Vhat is pennissible
against those who are not enemies, or do not want to be called
enemies, but who furnish our enemies with supplies? For we
know that this subject has been keenly debated in both ancient
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and n1ollern times, since some champion the relentlessness of
warfare and others the freedom of commercial relations.
First, we must make distinctions with reference to the things
supplied. There are some things, such as weapons, which are
useful only in war; other things which are of no use in war,
as those which minister to pleasure ; and others still which are
of use both in time of war and at other times, as money, provisions, ships, and naval equipment. (Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Grotius, "De Jure Belli ac Pacis ", Vol. II,
Book III, Chap. I, V, p. 601.)

In this chapter Grotius shows how questions in regard
to these three. classes of goods have been regarded both
in early practice and in law. He quotes Seneca (3
B.C.-65 A.D.) :
:Money, by means of which a satellite 1nay be kept in service,
I shall not supply. If he shall desire marbles and robes, that
which his luxurious taste amasses will harm no one; soldiery
and arms I shan not furnish. If, as a great favour, he seeks
craftsmen of the stage and things which may soften his savagery,
I shall gladly proffer them. To hin1 to whom I would not send
triremes or ships with bronze rams, I shall send, pleasure craft,
and sleeping-barges, and other follies of kings who revel on the
sea. " On Benefits ", VII, xx. Car (Ibid, p. 602).

Grotius set out also that the practices had not been
consistent among different states or at different times
in the same state.
Attitude of United States.-Even before the American
colonies became independent, the. matter of treatment of
goods of the nature of contraband was considered in the
Continental Congress. (III Journals 371-375, 437; IV
Ibid, 229-232; 253-254; V Ibid, 768.) Some of these
documents use the word contraband and refer to " prohibited or contraband goods." In general during the
eighteenth century the doctrine of "' free ships, free
goods, except contraband of war " met with growing
favdr-~and mariy added "free·goods"always free."
The lists such as in the treaty with France, February
6, 1778, vary, but cover most of the articles later included
in the categories of absolute and conditional contraband
though no such distinction is there made.
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'fhe instructions issued in 1780 to commanders of
private armed vessels having commissions or letters of
n1arque and reprisal enjoined then1 to take care "not to
infringe or violate the laws o£ nations, or the laws o£
neutrality ", and not to interfere with vessels of allies
unless they were "employed in carrying contraband
goods or soldiers to our enemies."
Arnerican treaties and contraband.-The United States
entered into about 25 treaties containing provisions
relating to contraband during the nineteenth century.
So1ne of the treaties provided that " in general, whatever
is comprised under the denomination of arms and military stores, of what description soever, shall be deemed
objects of contraband." (Prussia, 1828.) Others, as the
treaty 'vith Brazil, 1828, specifically enlnnerated contraband.
ARTICLE XVI. This liberty of cmnmerce and navigation shall
extend to all kinds of merchandises, excepting those only which
are distinguished by the na1ne of contraband; and under this
nan1e of contraband or prohibited goods shall be con1prehendedlst. Cannons, mortars, howitzers, swivels, blunderbusses, muskets, fuzees, rifles, carbines, pistols, pikes, swords, sabres, lances,
spears, halberds and grenades, bombs, powder, matches, balls and
all other things belonging to the use of these arms.
2d. Bucklers, helmets, breast plates, coats of mail, infantry
belts and clothes 1nade up in the form and for a military use.
3d. Cavalry belts, and horses with their furniture.
4th. And generally all kinds of arms and instru1nents of iron,
steel, brass and copper or of any other materials manufactured,
prepared and fonned expressly to make· war by sea or land.
ARTICLE XVII. All other 1nerchandlse and things not comprellended in the articles of contrabancl, expressly enumerated and
classified as above, shall be held and' considered as free and subjects of free and lawful conunerce·, so that they 1nay be carried
and transported in the freest n1anner by both the contracting
parties, ev~n to places belonging to an enemy, excepting only
those places which are at that time besieged or blockaded;. and,
to avoid all doubt in this particular, it is declared that those
places nre only besieged or blockaded which are actually attacked
by a force capable of preventing the entry of the neutral. (8 U.S.
Statut·es, Part II, pp. 390, 394.)

DECLARATION OF LONDON

7

Other treaties with South American states contained
sjtnilar provisions.
Declaration of London lists, 1909-14.-Early in the
orld War the belligerents showed a disposition to adopt
the list as set forth in the unratified Declaration of London of 1909. The list of absolute contraband 'vas,

"'r

( 1.) Arms of all kinds, including anns for sporting purposes,
and their unassembled distinctive parts.
(2.) Projectiles, charges, and cartridges of all kinds, and their
unassembled distinctive parts.
(3.) Powder and explosives specially adapted for use in 'var.
( 4.) Gun-carriages, caissons, limbers, military ,wagons, field
forges, and their unassembled distinctive parts.
( 5.) Clothing and equipment of a distinctively tnilitary character.
( 6.) All kinds of harness of a distinctively n1ilitary character.
(7.) Saddle, draught, and pack anin1als suitab~e for use in war.
( 8.) Articles of camp equipment, and their unassen1bled distinctive parts.
(9.) Armor plates.
( 10.) 'Varships and boats and their unassembled parts speeially distinctive as suitable for use only in a vessel of war.
(11). Implements and apparatus made exclusively for the manufacture of munitions of war, for the tnanufacture or repair of
arms, or of military material for use on land or sea. (1909 Naval
'Var College, International Law Topics, p. 59.)

This list of absolute contraband 'vas the sa;me as that
upon 'vhich agreement had· been reached at the Second
Hague Peace Conference in 1907~
The subject of conditional contraband was considered
at the sa1ne conference but "lack of time and the complication of interests involved did not admit of the elaboration at present [1907] of a text adopted by all." (1
Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conference, p. 259.)
At this Second Peace Conference, the American naval
delegate, Admiral Sperry, former president of theN a val
War College, and the British seemed to be favorable to
the exclusion of any list of conditional contraband.
Admiral Sperry also suggested:
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That a paragraph be added to the list already approved, stipulating that no article is to be included in this list \vhich is not intended exclusively for military use, and moreover that trade in
any article 'vhatever not legally included in the list shall never
be prohibited as the result of a state of 'var. (Ibid, p. 1116.)

At the London Naval Conference, 1908-09, suggestions
fro1n the 10 leading maritime states varied in regard to
conditional contraband. Some states favored the abolition of the category or conditional contraband as in the
case of Spain and The Netherlands, and some made
propositions of a general character covering articles
"\vhich 1night be useful in peace and 'var. After n1uch
discussion in the Conference a list of conditional contraband was also drawn up and embodied in the follo·wing ter1ns:
ARTICLE 24. The following articles and materials susceptible of
use in 'var as well as for purposes of peace, are without notice,
regarded as contraband of war, under the name of conditional
contraband:
(1.) Food.
(2.) Forage and grain suitable for feeding animals.
(3.) Clothing and fabrics for clothing, boots and shoes, suitable
for military use.
( 4.) Gold and silver in coin or bullion; paper money.
(5.) Vehicles of all kinds available for use in war, and their
unassembled parts.
(6.) Vessels, craft and boats of all kinds, floating docks, parts
of docks, as also their unassembled parts.
(J.) Fixed railway material and rolling-stock, and material
for telegraphs, radio telegraphs, and telephones.
( 8) Balloons and flying machines and their unassembled distinctive parts as also their accessories, articles and materials
distinctive as intended for use in connection with balloons or
flying machines.
( 9.) Fuel ; lubricants.
( 10.) Powder and explosives which are not specially adapted
for use in war.
( 11.) Barbed wire as also the implements for placing and
cutting the same.
(12.) Horseshoes and borseshoeing materials.
( l :J.) Harness and saddlery 1naterial.
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( 14.) Binocular glasses, telescopes, chronometers, and all kinds
of nautical instruments. (1909 Naval vVar College, International
Law r:ropics, p. 63.)

Provision 'vas made :for additions to the above list
by means of notified declarations in articles 23 and 25
and for o1nissions in article 26. In articles 27 and 28
atte1npt 'Yas 1nade to exen1pt articles 'vhich in general
are not susceptible of use in war and also certain articles
which 'vere in a specified :free list. Many of the articles
specifically exen1pted in 1909 were within a few years
of special use in 'var and before 1914 this list was seen
to be unduly restrictive. ·
l'he Declaration of London of 1909 had been operative dEring the 'furco-Italian War in 1911-12 as sho,vn
in the follow·ing dispatch of October 19, 1911.
By a royal decree of October 13 the following instructions
were approved in conformity with the principles of the Declaration of Paris, April 16, 1856, which belligerent countries are
bound to respect, with the rules of The Hague Conventions of
October 18, 1907, and of the Declaration of London of February
26, 1909, which the Government of the King desires to be respected as well, so far as the provisions of the laws in force
in the Kingdom allo,v, although they have not yet been ratified
by Italy; and they will serve to regulate the conduct of naval
commanders in the operations of capture and prize during the
war. (1912 Naval 'Var College, International Law Situations,
p. 108.) .

'fhe provisions of the:-!Declaration of London as re. gar~w,.,J~bsolute and ,c·o.n ditional con~r~band, 'vere before
1914 regarded as satisfactory in
of the articles
per1nitting changes on notification. There was, ho,vever, understandable criticisms of the list of articles
entune.rated as not to be declared contraband of war.
There 'vas little criticism o£ article 29 which provided:

vi:e'v

Neither are the following to be regarded as contraband of
war:
(1) Articles and materials serving exclusively for the care
of the sick and wounded. They may, nevertheless, in case of
urgent military necessity and subject to the payment of com-
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pensation, be requisitioned, if their destination is that specified
in Article 30.
(2) Articles and materials intended for the use of the vessel
in which they are found, as well as those for the use of her
crew and passengers during the voyage (1909 Naval 'Var College, International Law Topics, p. 71.)

l\1any of the provisions of the Declaration of London
·were embodied in national rules before 1914 and \vhile
some of these re1nained in force during the World War,
the provisions relating to contraband because of changes
in the use of .1naterials and methods of \varfare. suffered
\vide extensions.
Early ·world War changes in contrabarnd lists.-The
British Government had on August 5, 1914, made known
that it \Vould regard as contraband the articles na~ed
as absolute and conditional contraband in the Declaration of London \vith the transfer of aircraft fron1 the ·
conditional to the absolute list.
On August 6, 1914, the A1nerican Secretary of State
addressed to the American A1nbassadors in the belligerent states and the Minister to Belgium an inquiry as to
whether the respective states \Vere "\Villing to agree that
the la\vs of naval \varfare laid do,vn by the Declaration
of London, 1909, shall be applicable to naval warfare
during the present European conflict, provided that the
governments \vith \Vhom" they \Vere or might be at
\Var also agree tq such appl~cation. The Secretary also
said, " You will further state that this Governn1ent believes that acceptance of these laws by the belligerents
would prevent grave n~isunderstandings \Vhich may
arise as to the relations between belligerent and neutral
po,vers. It, therefore, ea!·nestly hopes that this inquiry
n1ay receive favorable consideration." (1914 U.S. Foreign Relations, Supplement, p. 216.)
Germany, August 10, and Austria-Hungary, August
13, replied to the effect that they \Vould observe the provisions of the Declaration of London conditioned upon
"like observance on the part of the enemy."
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As replies 'vere delayed fro1n other states, the Secretary of State sent another telegra1n, August 19, pressing
for reply. The reply fro1n the British Foreign Office
dated August 22 but received in Washington August 26,
1914, stated that the British Government had "decided
to adopt generally the rules of the declaration in question, subject to certain n1odifications and additions 'vhich
they judge indispensable to the efficient conduct of their
naval operations." These n1odifications changed the
lists of contraband, duration o:f liability and presuinption of destination as 'vell as other provisions. Russia.
and France :follo,ved Great Britain. The Govern1nent of
the United States examined the British propositio.ns
hoping they might be of such character that the Government could advise general acceptance, but could not
reach such a concl usj on. Nevertheless, in a note of
September 26, 1914, the Acting Secretary of State 'vrote:

* * * The United States stands ready either to accept the
declaration as a whole, provided all of the belligerents accept
it, or, to accept it for the period of the war with Inodifications
and additions acceptable, on the one hand, to the United States
and the Netherlands, the two neutral signatories, and, on th(_=)
other hand, to all of the belligerents.
This Government in seeking general acceptance of the declara
tion as a code of naval warfare for the present war hacl in mind
the adoption of the declaration as a whole and not such part of
it as might be acceptable to certain belligerents and not to oth~r
belligerents. It considered that the declaration was to be applied as a cmnplete code of which no rule could be ignorecl or surlplemented, and in so doing it followed Article 65· of the declaration, \Vhich stipulates: "The pr·ovisions of t_he present declaration
must be treated as a whole and ca"..lnot be separated."
The only reasonable explanation for the inclusion in the clec·
laration of this requirement is that the instrument is cmnposed
largely of compromises on the part of the govennnen ts represented at the conference. Although tbe cleclara tion is introduced
with a general statement that "the signatory powers are agreed"
that the rules contained in the declaration "correspond in substance with the generally recognized principles of international
I a w ?', the proceedings of the conference as well as the docu1nents
relating to it prove that an agreement on many of the articles
73500-34--2
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wns reached through reciprocal concessions. Being conceived in
compromise and concession the declaration was accepted by the
Government of the United States at the conference in London
in the earnest hope that it might finally compose the differences
which existed as to neutral rights and neutral duties, although
in so accepting this Government was compelled to abandon certain rules of conduct which it has heretofore always maintained.
As might be expected in a settletnent of divergent views and
vractices by mutual concession the Declaration of London contains provisions both advantageous and disadvantageous to the
respective interests of neutrals and belligerents. But it is now
proposed by Great Britain to retain all the provisions favorable
to belligerents and to recast other provisions so that they will be
less favorable to neutral interests. The result is a set of rules
which limits neutrals' rights far more than does the declaration
itself treated as a whole. 'Var, in any event, bears heavily
upon a neutral nation. The interrup'tion of its commerce and
the limitations placed upon its trade are sufficiently burdensome
t!nder the rules of the Declaration of London. In consenting
tQ those rules the Government of the United States n1ade
great concessions on its part and it does not feel that it can,
in justice to its own people, go further. It cannot consent to
the retention of a part of this compromise settlement and to
the rejection of another part. The adoption of the declaration
so modified is contrary to the customary procedure incid'ent to
compromise settlements, to the express provisions of the declaration itself, and to the spirit which induced its signature.
(Ibid, p. 227.)

This note :further stated that the British modifications
struck at accepted neutral rights, created misunderstandings, revised practices s~pposed to be abandoned even
by Great Britain and·, · i:£ admitted, might place the
United States in an equivocat position 'vhich 1night imperil the :friendly relations with Great Britain.
In a memorandun1 o:£ a conference o:£ Acting Secretary Lansing 'vith the British Ambassador on September
29, 1914, it is sai~.'
A discussion of the provisions of the order in council followed
in which the Ambassador said that he agreed that the order in
council practically made foodstuffs absolute contraband, \Vhich
was contrary to the British traditional policy as well as. to that
of the United States. He said that the inunediate cause had
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been the introduction through Rotterdam in first days of the
war of large quantities of food supplies for the German army in
Belgium, and that it seemed absolutely necessary to stop this
traffic.
I replied that, w bile I appreciated that such reasons n1ust
weigh yer~r heaYily with those responsible for the successful conduct of the war, it seemed unfortunate that some other Ineans
could not have been found to accomplish the desired purpose,
either by getting the Netherlands to place an embargo on food~tuffs and other conditional contraband or by agreeing not to reexport such articles. The Ambassador said that he agreed that
would be Inuch the better way, and that he believed it could
be done.
He said that now the chief anxiety see1ned to be in regard to
shipinents of copper and petroleum and also of · Swedish iron, and
that the British Government was stopping vessels 'vith such cargoes and purchasing them. He suggested that possibly the difficulty ere a ted by the orcler in council could be removed by rescinding it and adding to the list of absolute contraband petrolpum products, copper, barbed wire and other artici'es of like
nature now used almost exclusively for war purposes.
I said that as to this suggestion I could not speak for the
Government but that it seemed worthy of consideration as it
might offer a n1eans of getting rid of the order in council which
certainly menaced the very friendly relations existing if it became
the subject of discussion by the press. I told him that I did not
think that the feeling which the order in council would arouse
when generally understood, would be among the shippers as much
as among the A1nerican public at large; and that, even if no case
arose under it, the fact that the British Govern1nent had issued
a decree, which Inenaced the cmnmercial rights of the United
States as a neutral, in violation of the generally accepted rules
of international law, would undoubtedly cause irritation, if not
indignation, and might change the sentiment of the American
people, of which Great Britain had no reason to complain at the
present time. (Ibid., p. 234.)

There 'vas n1uch interchange of opinion between the
belligerents and neutrals in regard to contraband. The
European neutral states being the smaller states were
often obliged to yield to the terms proposed by the strong
belligerents. Each belligerent brought forth the arguJnent that its extreme action was based on self-defense
which .n1ight justify the setting aside its obligations
1nuler international law.

14

CONTRABAND AND BLOCKADE

The United States, a powerful neutral, in its early
contentions maintained the attitude of a state about to
insist upon its neutral rights. Great Britain in a comInunication o:f October 9, 1914, indicated that its list of
contraband should, subject to certain additions and modifications, conform to the Declaration of London and that
it was hoped this. list would meet the approval of the
United States. This proposed list did include under
absolute contraband rubber and ores 'vhich under article
28 of the Declaration o:f London had unwisely been
placed in the list of articles not to be declared contraband of 'var . . Some equable adjusbnent bet,veen the
Department of State of the United States and Great
Britain on the basis of actual war conditions and needs
see1ned to be foreshaclo,ved in early October 1914. On
October 15, Mr. "\Valter Hines Page, A1nbassador to
Great Britain, said in a co1nmunication to the Secretary
Gf State:
I recom1nend most earnestly the substantial acceptance of the
uew order in council or our acquiescence with a reservation of
whatever rights we may have; and I reconunend prompt information to the British Government of such action. (1914 U.S. Foreign Relations, Supplement, p. 2.49.)

To follow this recommendation would involve abandoning many o:f the positions 'vhich the State Departnlent had recently taken and on October 16 the DepartInent of State sent to the American An1bassador in
Great Britain a telegram embodying certain new plans.
The desire of this Govenunent is ·to obtain from the British
Government the issuance of an order in council adopting th~
declaration without any an1endment whatsoever and to obtain
from France and Russia like decrees, vd1ich they will undoubtedly issue if Great Britain sets the example. Such an adoption
by the allied Govenunents will put in force the acceptance of the
Declaration of London by Gennany and Austria, 'Yhich will thus
becmne for all the belligerent powers the code of naval warfare
during the present conflict. This is the ailn of the United State8.
It cannot be accomplished if the declaration is changed in any
way as Gern1any and Austria would not giYe their consent to a
change.
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In the frequent informal and confidential conversations which
have taken place here and in the admirable frankness with which
Sir Edward Grey has stated the reasons for the action which
Great Britain has deemed it necessary to take in regard to the
declaration, this Government feels that it fully understands and
appreciates the British position, and is not disposed to place
obstacles in the way of the accomplishment of the purposes which
the British representatives have so frankly stated.
The confidence thus reported in this Government makes it
appreciate n1ore than eYer the staunch friendship of Great Britain
for the United States, which it hopes always to deserve.
This GoYernment would not feel \varranted in offering any suggestion to the Briti-sh GoYernment as to a course which would meet
the wishes of this GoYertunent and at the same time accomplish
the ends which Great Britain seeks, but you might in the strictest
confidence intimate to Sir Edward Grey the following plan, at the
same time stating Yery explicitly that it is your personal suggestion and not one for ·which your GoYernment is responsible.
Let the British GoYernment issue an order in council accepting
the Declaration of London without change or addition, and repealing all preYious conflicting orders in council.
Let this order in council be followed by a proclamation adding
articles to the lists of absolute and conditional contraband by
virtue of the authority conferred by Articles 23 and 25 of the
declaration.
Let the proclamation be followed by another order in council,
of \Vhich the United States need not be previously advised, declaring that, \Vhen one of His l\lajesty's Principal Secretaries of State
is conYinced that a port or the territory of a neutral country is
being used as a base for the transit of supplies for an enemy governlnent a proclan1ation shall issue declaring that such port or
territory has acquired enemy character in so far as trade in
contraband is concerned and that vessels trading therewith shall
be thereafter subject to the rules of the declaration governing
trade to enemy's territory.
it is true that the latter order in council would be based on a
new principle. The excuse \vould be that the Declaration of Londqn failing to provide for such an exceptional condition as exists,
a belligerent has a right to give a reasonable interpretation to
the rules of the declaration so that they will not leave him helpless to prevent an eqemy from obtaining supplies for his military
forces although the belligerent may possess the power and would
have the right to do so if the port or territory 'vas occupied by
the enemy.
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\Vhen the last-mentioned order in council is issued, I am conYinced that a full explanation "of its nature and necessity would
meet with liberal consideration by this Governrnent and not be
the subject of serious objection.
I repeat that any suggestion, which you may make to Sir,
Edward Grey, must be done in an entirely personal way and with
the distinct understanding that this Governn1ent is in no way
responsible for what you may say. (Ibid, p. 249.)

In his telegram from London of October 15, 1914, relating to differences in regard to the Declaration of London and shipping questions, the American Ambassador,
Mr. Page, had said:
The question seems wholly different here fron1 what it probably seems in Washington. There it is a more or less academic
discussion. Here it is a matter of life and death for English-·
speaking civilization. It is not a happy tin1e to raise controversies that can be avoided or postponed. Nothing can be
gained and every chance for useful cooperation for peace can
easily be thrown away and is now in jeopardy. In jeopardy also
are our friendly relations with Great Britain in the sorest time
of need in her history. I know that this is the correct, larger
view. (Ibid, p. 248.)

The United States as a neutral state had proposed
the maintenance of neutral rights and the President him
self replied on October 16.
4

Beg that you will not regard the position of this Government
as merely acadernic. Contact with opinion on this side the
water would materially alter your view. Lansing has pointed
out to you in personal confidential despatch of this date how
completely all the British Government seeks can be accomplished
without the least friction with this Government and without
touching opinion on this side the water on an exceedingly tender
spot. I must urge you to realize this aspect of the rna tter and
to use your utmost persuasive efforts to effect an understanding,
which we earnestly desire, by the method we have gone out of
our way to sugg~st, which will put the whole case in unimpeachable: form . .
This is private and for your guidance.
WOODROW \VILSON.

(Ibid, p. 252.)

Disappearance of contraband distinctions.-In a proclalnation revising the British contraband list, October
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29, 1914, there \Yere t-wo schedules, one to be treated as
absolute contraband and the other as conditional contraband.
Vigorous protests had arisen against the German War
Zone procla1nation of February 4, 1915, which declared
the \Vaters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland
to be comprised "\Yithin the seat of war and that all enen1y merchant vessels found in those waters after the eighteenth instant
will be destroyed although it may not always be possible to save
crews and passengers.
Neutral Yessels expose themselves to danger within this zone
of war since in view of the misuse of the neutral flag ordered
by the British Government on January thirty-first and of the
contingencies of maritime warfare it cannot always be avoided
that neutral yessels suffer from attacks intended to strike enemy
ships. ( 1915 U.S. Foreign· Relations, Supplen1ent, p. 94.)

rfhe attitude of Great Britain in regard to American
co1nn1unications on contraband and 1naritime warfare in
general as vie,ved by the An1erican An1bassador in Great
Britain 1nay be seen in the follovving telegram of May
21, 1915, to the Sec.retary of State:
Unofficial critics praise the courtesy and admit the propriety
of our communications, but they regard then1 as re1note and
impracticable. They point out that we haYe not carried our
voints: namely, that copper should not be contraband, that ships
should be searched at sea, that to-order cargoes should be valid,
that our export trade bad fallen off because of the war. They
point out tilese in good-natured criticisn1 as evidence of the
American love of protest for political effect at home. vVhile the
official reception of our communications is dignified, the unofficial and general attitude to them is a smile at our love of
letter writing as at Fourth of July orations. They quietly laugh
at our effort to regulate sea warfare under new conditions by
what they regard as lawyers' disquisitions out of textbooks. They
[receive] them with courtesy, pay no further attention to the111,
proceed to settle our -shipping disputes with an effort at generosity an'd quadnipi~ ' thieir order's :fr"6n:i ' \is of war materials.'
They care nothing for our definitions or general protests but are
willing to do us every practical favor and will under no conditions either take our advice or offend us. They regard our
writings as addressed either to complaining shippers or to politicians at home.
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For these reasons complaints about concrete cases as they
arise are tnore effective than general communications about rules
of sea warfare, which must be revised by the submarine, the
aeroplane, the mine and our own precedents. (Ibid, p. 147.)

Further restrictions were put by the Allied Powers
upon goods coming from or bound to Germany, and the
1\..1nerican Secretary of State on March 30 said that the
action constituted:
a practical assertion of unlimited belligerent rights over neutral
couunerce within the whole European area, and an almost unqualified denial of the sovereign rights of the nations now at
peace.
This Government takes it for granted that there can be no
question what those rights are. A nation's sovereignty over its
own ships· and citizens under its own flag on the high seas in
time of peace is, of course, unlimited; and that sovereignty suffers no din1inution in time. of war, except in so far as the practice and consent of civilized nations has limited it by the recognition of certain now clearly detennined rights, which it is conceded tnay be exercised by nations which are at war. (Ibid.,
p. 152.)

In a long note of February 12, 1915, from the British
F.,oreign Secretary to the American Ambassador, it ·was
said:
The n1ost difficult questions in connection with conditional contraband arise with reference to the shipment of foodstuffs. No
country has tnaintained more stoutly than Great Britain in tnodern times the principle that a belligerent should abstain from
interference with the foodstuffs intended for the. civil population.
The circumstances of the present struggle are causing His 1\Iajesty's Government some anxiety as to whether the existing rules
with regard to conditional contraband, framed as they were with
the object of protecting so far as possible the supplies which
were intended for the civil population are effective for the purpose, or suitable to the conditions present. The principle which
I have indicated above is one which His l\1ajesty's Governtnent
have constantly had to uphold against the opposition of continental powers. In the absence of smne certainty that the rule
would be respected by both parties to this conflict, we feel great
doubt whether it sllould be regarded as an established principle
of international law. * * *

CONDITIONAL CONTRABAND PROBLEMS

19

The reason for drawing a distinction between foodstuffs intended for the civil population and those for the armed f<;>rces
or ene1ny Government disappears when the distinction between
the civil population and the armed forces itself disappears.
In any country in which there exists such tremendous organization for war as now obtains in Germany there is no clear
diversion [(livision] between those whom the Government is re~ponsible for feeding and those whom it is not.
Experience shows
that the power to requisition will be used to the fullest extent
in order to 1nake sure that the wants of the 1nilitary are· supplied, and however much goods may be imported for civil u~e it
is by the n1ilitary that they will be consumed if n1ilitary exigencies require it, especially now that the German Government have
taken control of all the foodstuffs in the country. (Ibid., p.
332.)

The Department of State of the United States on October 28, 1915, made certain inquiries in regard to the
control of Ger1nan resources and imports by the Government itself.
In Department's consideration of destination of conditional con~
traband, it is necessary to ascertain to what extent the military
authorities have superseded civil authorities in the Government
of Germany so far as control over imports are concerned, and to
what extent the Government controls the use of articles on contraband list of Great Britain and her allies. Are private consignees free to import such articles without interference by
authorities? (Ibid., p. 603.)

In reply to the above query, the :following was received
•
:from Berlin on December 4, 1915 :
Following information communicated verbally by Foreign Office;
written answer promised :
(1) Owing to proclan1ation issued at outbreak of war, military
authorities theoretically have power to supersede civil authorities,
but, practically, power has been exercised in only few instances
and not at all in connection \Vith customs authorities.
(2) In so far as control of use of imported goods is concerned,
Government regards enemy's list of conditional contraband a·s of
no importance.
( 3) Receipt and distribution of certain imported food and
fodder products may take place only through central organization which distributes to civil parties only, but military authori~
ties have power to requisition against payment anything needed
by army or navy.
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Chancellor has power to grant exemption from control and distribution and military authorities have power to guarantee in
advance freedom from requisition of designated imported consignments in whole or part. (Ibid, p. 622.)

The protests of neutrals were answered after varying
periods of delay but:at length· the Seqretary of State of
the United States after much correspondence said in a
communication to the Am~assador in Great Britain,
November 11, 1916,
SIR: With reference to the announcen1ent 1nad·e by the British
Foreign Office, under date of April 13, 1916, of the intention of
the British Government to treat alike absolute and conditional
('Ontraband, you are instructed to communicate to the Foreign
Office a formal reservation, in regard to this announcement, in
the sense that, in view of the established practice of a number
of maritime nations, including Great Britain and the United
States, of disUnguishing :: between absolute and conditional contraband, the Government of the United States is impelled to
notify the British Government of the reservation of all rights of
tbe United States or its citizens in respect of any American interests which may be adversely affected by the abolition of the
distinction between these two classes of contraband, or by the
illegal extension of the contraband lists during the present war
by Great Britain and her allies. (1916 U.S. Foreign Relations,
Supplement, p. 483.)

The "Kim" and three other ships, 1915.-In October
and November 1914 the Ki1n, the Alfred Nobel, the
B jornsterjne Bjornson, and the Fridland, all Norwegian ships except the Fridla;nd, which was Swedish,
sailed from New York for Copenhagen. In their cargoes were foodstuffs, rubber, and hides. The treatment
of the cargoes and of the ships were made separate cases,
and the reprisals order of March 11, 1915, was not made
applicable.
In these cases inference as to ultimate destination to
Germany of goods consigned to Copenhagen was based
in the first instance upon the rapid increase in the relative amount of such goods shipped to Copenhagen in
corresponding months of 1913 and 1914. There 'vas also
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an argument on the ground of evident deception and
misinformation. The opinion states that
Two important doctrines farniliar to international law come
prominently forward for consideration; the one is embodied in
the rule as to "continuous voyage," or continuous "transportation;" the ·~ther relates to the uitimafe liostiie"'·· destina:tion of
conditional and absolute contraband, respectively. ( [1915] P.
215; reprinted, 1922 Naval War College International Law Documents, 11. 50.)

'fhe lists of contraband both absolute and conditional
have varied from time to time and according to circumstances. 'The belligerent has usually stood for an ext€nded list 1Yhile the neutral has desired a restricted list.
Destination has al ,;~ ays been a deciding factor in determining contraband. This has b~en particularly important in the application of the doctrine of continuous
voyage. It has been maintained that the . ultimate destination is to the country in which the goods are actually
to become " a part of the common stock."
Many of the questions relating to ulti1nate destination
were raised in the American Civil War. The party to
whon1 the goods 1nay be consigned does not always prove
the ultimate destination. Goods often in time of peace are
"to order or assigns." Even the British Government in
the American Civil War did not deny that such consignInents on British vessels might not be open to suspicion
"which might be dispelled by the shippers." Somewhat
~imilar questions 1night arise in shipments of goods to
branches or agents or when no consignee is na1ned.
In the case of the J(im, however, it was stated that:
It is, no doubt, incurp.bent upon the captors in the first instance
to prove facts from which a reasonable ·.-mference of hostile destination can be drawn, subject to rebuttal by the claimants. (Ibid.)

Destination.-!£ a distinction is made bet,veen absolute
and conditional contraband, the distinction between eneiny country and enemy forces becomes i1nportant. If
an unfortified area becomes fortified, its status changes
as a place to which goods may without liability be
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shipped. I:£ the population o:£ an area 'vhich has been
subject only to the civil law is mobilized and put under
military control the status o:f the population changes as
a population to which goods may 'vithout liability be
shipped. I:£ the business o:£ a consignee o:£ a. cargo
should suddenly change, as :from a la 'vyer with no trade
relations and on a small salary to a merchant ship owner
to whom large and valuable cargoes 'vere consigned, the
burden o:f proof o:f the genuineness o:f the consignment
n1ight be upon him. (The Hillerod, 1918, App. Cas.
412.)
Direct interference with neutral trade.-The accepted
laws o:£ war give to belligerents the right to interfere
with neutral trade in two respects, contraband and blockade. Extension o:£ these rights may involve continuous
voyage or ultimate destination and there are certain
analogies to unneutral service. During the World "\"\r ar
as difficulties in maintaining blockades in north ~urope
increased, 1nore reliance was placed upon the liberal or
extreme interpretation o.:f the la,vs in regard to contraband without, in the early stages o:f the war, resort to
what were later called reprisals. There 'vere also many
changes in trade relations due to introduction o:£ new
1neans of transportation and com1nunication between
n1erchants in different states which made the application
o:£ some o:£ the decisions o:£ the nineteenth century doubtful. The tonnage o:£ n1odern merchant vessels 1nay make
the problem o:£ search much n1ore difficult than in the
early nineteenth century when the. captured vessels were
ordinarily under 250 tons. Ho'v :far a merchant vessel
o:£ a neutral of 25,000 or 50,000 tons with its passengers
may be delayed or diverted :for visit or search or what
may justify such delay or diversion are still debatable
questions. The changes in the nature o:f materials used
in war have made it more difficult to list articles 'vhich
n1ay be liable to capture. Chemical processes have. in
recent years greatly enlarged the list o:£ n1aterials useful
for or essential in 'var. Other processes and uses may
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render son1e n1aterials obsolete. and introduce new categories.
Exempt articl-es.-While hospital supplies usually received a n1easure of consideration in transit from neutral
to belligerent countries, other articles were fro1n time to
ti1ne allo·wed to be exported. Son1e neutral states, o'ving
to w·eakness, protested and subn1itted to restrictions generally acln1ittecl to be beyond the limits of legality. Some
neutral states, for reasons less evident, submitted to unjustifiable interference 'vith co1n1nerce.
A. rticles other than hospital supplies which supposedly
could be of no service in " .,. ar ''ere so1netimes 1nentioned
as in the con1n1unication of the Consul General at London
to the Secretary of State, Dece1nber 23, 1916 :
Proclmnation issued to-day requires that all articles exported to
Holland be consigned to Dutch Government, diplmnatic or consular officers, with permission of ~linistry of Foreign Affairs, or
Netherlands Oversea Trust, except printed matter, returned containers, worn clothing and personal effects, live animals not used
for food, sanitary earthenware, pottery and common earthenware,
books, dolls, toys, wooden clock cases, slate and slate pencils,
postage stamp and postcard albums. Proclamation apparently
intended to permit free shipment of articles here mentioned.
SKINNER.

(1916 U.8. Foreign Relations Supplement, p. 490.)

H ospitaZ supplies.-The American Ambassador 1n
Spain sent on Septe1nber 22, 1914, to the Secretary of
State the following telegram:
In an interdew yesterday morning His Majesty informed me
confidentially condition of wounded soldiers, particularly in French
hospitals where there are inadequate supplies, especially of banduges and absorbent cotton~ was deplorable and expressed an
earnest wish for our cooperation in relieving this situation. To
that end he hopes that the United States and Spanish Ambassadors accredited near various European courts now at war will
1nake a joint request for arrangements between countries of hospital supplies and the such supplies in transit on the high seas may
be considered by them neither contraband nor conditional contrabnnd of war but free. Please telegraph whether Departlnent can
see its way clear to give to our diplomatic officers concerned the
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instruttions necessary to realize His l\Iajesty's hope.
Foreign Relations, Supplement, p. 831.)

(1914 U.S.

The An1erican Government immediately com1nunicated
this request to diplomatic representatives of the United
States in the belligerent countries. It was naturally suggested that the detailed list of articles should be deterinined, but agreement ·in principle was general. The
Russian reply favored a broad interpretation. The. GerInan reply follows:
Your circular September 24. The Foreign Office replies to joint
request that No. 28, paragraph 1, of the German prize ordinance of
September 30, 1909, already provides that articles serving exclusively to aid the sick and wounded shall not be treated as
contraband and may be requisitioned subject to payment compensation only in case of urgent military necessity and when their
destination is to the territory of the enemy or to territory occupied by the enemy or to the armed forces of the enemy. (Ibid,
p. 835.)

The French Government said:
'Vhile appreciating the humanitarian attitude of the United
States Government, the French Government does not think the
n1oment propitious for agreement between belligerents, even on
a subject which by its character should be placed beyond' reach
of conflict. Experience of contempt which certain belligerents
show for international conventions to which they have agreed
gives grounds for apprehension that they 'vould not observe a
new agreement nor execute its provisions as soon as it 'vas to
their advantage not to do so. The French Government recalls
that definition of objects mentioned in Article 29 of the Declaration of London was summarily made in the general report at
the London conference by the drafting cmn1nittee, and it was
thus agreed that the immunity established under Article 29 applied to 'drugs and various medicines. , The French GOYPrnment
adds that while it might be a delicate matter to be 1nore precise and extend obligations of belligerents during war beyond
where they were fixed in time of peace, nevertheless it would not
refuse to study the suggestions of the A1nerican Govern1nent to
draw up a list of drugs and medicines whose character as "arti- •
des serving exclusively to aid the sick and wounded " shall be
closely defined. (Ibid, p. 836.)
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Later much discussion was carried on and Great Britain
withdrew the list of articles to which the British Government had given exemption.
The attitude of the British Government was considered· in a letter of ex-President Taft, then chairman
of the central com1nittee of the An1erican Red Cross
to the Secretary of State on l\1ay 8, 1916. In this letter
Mr. Taft said,
Since the beginning of the present war, the American Red
Cross has invited contributions of tnoney and supplies with
which to aid the w<>unded and suffering of all the belligerents.
'Ve have shipped to the Red Cross societies of each belligerent
hospital supplies contributed to us for that purpose. We have
found no difficulty in sending such article to the Entente Allies.
'Ve have had to obtain permits from Great Britain for the
shiptnents to the Red Cross of the Central powers. Until September 1915, there was substantially n<> delay in the granting
of these pennits by Great Britain. Since that time, we have
had much difficu~ty in securing them, and the supplies donated
in kind and designated for the use of the Central powers have
accumulated in our 'varehouses in New York. A pennit was
granted for only one shipment since that time-in January of
this sear. Through your Department, we are now in receipt
of a communication from the British Government, announcing
that it d<>es no~ intend to permit any further shipments, unless
it is a shipment to our own hospital units, in a territory of the
Central powers. This exception amounts to no concession, for ·
the reason that as the British Governtnent was advised in August
last, after the first of October, for Jack of funds, we were able
to maintain n<> hospital units in any of the belligerent countries.
The authorities of the American Red Cross believe that under
the Geneva convention, to which the United States and all the
belligerent powers are signatories, the United States has the
treaty right to insist that articles serving exclusively to aid the
sick and wounded in the fonn of hospital supplies, shipped by
the American Red Cross to the Red Cross of the Central powers,
shall not be declared c<>ntraband, but shall be allowed safeconduct to their destination. (1916 U.S. Foreign· Relations, Supplement, p. 948.)

Contraband distinctions.-..A. s 'vas sho,vn in the World
War, it is difficult and at ti1nes i1npossible to distinguish
bet,veen absolute and conditional contraband. By na-
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ture, some goods may equally serve the combatant and
nonco1nbatant population. If a consignment of goods is
unquestionably for the civil" population in a given area,
these goods may in fact make it possible to send to the
forces other goods 'vhich would have been essential in
that area without the consignment and it has been held
that it thus 1nakes little difference which goods go to
the forces as the result is the same. The means of transportation and 1nethods of 'varfare have so far changed
that nearly all parts of a state may serve its forces and
nearly all goods may be of use for the forces. Indeed
in the World War Ger1nan courts seemed to regard all
ports of England as ports which could be considered
bases and the British seemed to regard practically all
goods as of military use.
The distinctions bet,veen absolute and conditional contraband came to have little significance and to be little
applied in practice. During the World vVar Inost states
participating in the conflict formally abolished or tacitly
disregarded the distinction.
Situation I (a) involves two matters: (1) the abolition of the distinction between conditional and absolute
contraband; (2) the treatment of all goods bound for an
enemy country as contraband.
Contraband consists of articles which a neutral 1nay
not furnish to one belligerent without risk of capture
by the other belligerent. The essential ite1ns for consideration would be the nature of the article and the
destination.
Goods of the nature of contraband o£ which capture
1night be justified would be such as 'vould aid the belligerent in the conduct of the war. In early days 'vhen the
conduct of the war depended almost 'vholly upon supplying the enrolled armed forces with the simple impleInents of 'var, lists 'vere comparatively easy to draw up
and did not vary greatly from year to year. Pitch-balls
and javelins 1night be included in a contraband list, as
in the treaties with S'veden, 1783, and son1e other early
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treaties o:f the United States, but cotton and oil and
many other articles 'vere definitely excluded :from the
list, and it 'vas provided they " shall not by any pretended interpretation be con1prehended among prohibited or contraband· goods " unless bound to places
"besieged, blocked, or invested " so as to be "nearly surrounded by one o:f the belligerent powers."
The intention o:f such agree1nents 'vas to confine the
list of contraband to such articles as 'vere actually :for
'var use. Manifestly there:fore :for all contraband articles the destination 'vas a matter o:f equal importance
with the nature o:f the article itsel:f, :for i:f the article
'vhatever its nature,. was not destined :for 'var use it
'vould not be liable as contraband. Speaking o:f articles
o:f ordinary use such as provisions, Mr. Justice Story in
the case o:f the Oonunercen, 1816, said, "i:f destined :for
the army or navy o:f the ene1ny, or :for his ports o:f naval
or military equip1nent, they are deemed contraband."
(1 Wheat. 387.)
The attitude o:f leading states has varied in regard to
"~hat articles and when articles might be treated as
conditional contraband. Even during the World War
there were many conflicting opinions.
I:f a state mobilizes its whole population and all its resources :for war, evidently it will be difficult i:f not impossible to distinguish a1nong consignments destined :for that
state, and anything bound :for the state, unless exempted
on humanitarian grounds, 1nay be liable to capture as
contraband. The grounds o:f humanity would exempt
articles whose sole use would be :for medicinal and surgical purposes and articles necessary :for Red Cross operations.
The changing use and impossibility o:f determining
what may be o:f use in war :from day to day and the possibility o:f mobilization o:f population would there:fore
justi:fy the declaration that the distinction bet,veen absolute and conditional contraband is abolished.
70500-34-3
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All goods other than those solely for humanitarian and
Red Cross use might be declared contraband ..
Early blockades. 2-Some of the recent contentions in
regard to blockades are similar to those made as early as
the seventeenth century. The idea. of a place besieged on
land "\Vas coming to be applied to a port and for a ti1ne
it "\Vas held that it should be closed by the enemy on all
sides, landward as "\vell as sea 'vard. In the seventeenth
century, however, some of the pronouncements speak of
the ancient practice of forbidding transport of goods to
certain areas under penalty and there seem to have been
such proclamations as early as the thirteenth century~
Of course, there was great variety ·of practice in these
early days. rrhe Dutch notification of June 26, 1630, declared in accord with ancient usage that vessels bound for
enemy ports of Flanders, sailing from or entering, would
with their cargoes be liable to confiscation. There were
even in early days controversies in regard to what degree of force was essential to render such proclan1a tions
effective from a legal standpoint. Treaties of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries refer to ports " besieged,
blocked, or invested " and some prescribe how many ships.
shall be before a. port in order that the blockade may be
legal or how strong a battery 1nust be on shore. The need
of specification of li1nits to which the blockade would extend caine later. Under article XIII of the treaty bet,veen the United States and Sweden and N or"\vay, 1816,
merchant vessels of either, "\vhen one 'vas at 'var and the·
other "\vas neutral, 'vere entitled to notification of blockade at the line unless it could be proved that the neutral
vessel kne'v or should have known of the blockade.
Declaration of Paris, 1856.-The Declaration of Paris
of 1856 "\vas accepted as stating the approved attitude
upon blockade in the 1nidclle of the nineteenth century.
This declaration upon blockade "\vas " blockade in order
2 For treatment of special aspects of blockade, see
publications, 1901-32.

~a val

War College-

DECLARATIONS OF PARIS AND LONDON

29

to be binding 1nust be effective-that is to say maintained
by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast
of the enemy." This declaration has been repeatedly
reaffirmed even during the World War. Manifestly the
actual lvords 1nay not be taken too literally for if they
'vere strictly construed, blockade would cease to be binding when a single in,vard breech should occur, though
egress fron1 the COast "\VOUld not be considered in the
interpretation. 'Vhat it "\vas really ailned to prevent
"'"US resort to paper blockades by requiring a reasonably
adequate blockading force before the coast 'vhich was
declared blockaded.
As 'vas said in the Supre1ne Court of the United States
in 1899 in the case of the 0 linde R odrigttes .·
But it can not be that a vessel actually captured in atten1pting
to enter a blockaded port, after warning entered on her log by a
cruiser off that port only a few days before, could dispute the
efficiency of the force to "·hich she was subjected.
As v~·e hold that an effective blockade is a blockade so effective
as to make it dangerous in fact for vessels to attempt to enter
the blockaded port, it follows that the question of effectiveness is
not controlled by the number of the blockading force. In other
words, the position can not be maintained that one n1odern
cruiser though sufficient in fact is not sufficient as 1natter of la,v.
(174 u.s. 510.)

Declaration of London and blockade.-The provisions
of the unratified Declaration of London, 1909, 'vere
agreed upon by representatives of the naval powers after
full discussion. Article 1 of the Declaration of London
stated,
A blockade n1ust be limited to the ports and coasts belonging
to or occupied by the enemy.

The purpose of this article was, viewing blockade as
a war n1easure, to direct its consequences only against
the enemy. 'fhe Declaration of London regarded the
statement in the Declaration of Paris as the first neeessary condition and as a matter upon which "for a. long
tjme there has been universal agreement.." Detailed
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rules "\Vere prescribed :for the. establishing and ra1s1ng
of blockade.
Article 18 of the Declaration of London states that,
The blockading forces n1ust not bar access to the ports or to
the coasts of neutrals.

In the general report presented to the naval conference
on behalf of the drafting committee, it was said of
article 18,
This rule has been thought necessary for the better safeguarding of the co1nmercial interests of neutral countries; it
completes Article 1, according to which a blockade n1ust be lilnited to the ports and coasts of the ene1ny, which implies that,
since it is an operation of war, it should not be directed against
a neutral port, in spite of the interest that a belligerent may
have in it because of the part played by that neutral port in
supplying his adversary. (1909 Naval 'Var College, International Law Topics, p. 53.)

During the 'vars bet,ve.en 1909 and 1914 the provisions
of the Declaration of London in regard to blockade were

follo,ved.
During the early days of the World vV ar there 'vere
son1e slight changes in the provisions. in regard to pre-suinption of knowledge of blockade. In the areas out~ide of Western Europe the blockade was declared 'vith
the understood respect :for ordinary rules.
A1nerican views.-Early in the 'Vorld vVar controversies arose in regard to the use of ships in the neighborhood of the North Sea. Great Britain and Gern1any
particularly argued with neutrals in regard to violation
of neutral rights. The Government o:f the United States
proposed adherence to the Declaration of London, but
this "\Vas not adopted. The Govern1nent of the United
States also protested against the extension of interference \vith American trade and British Orders in Council
·were mentioned in con1munications from the Deparhnent
of State as early as September 29, 1914, as n1enacing
"the commercial rights of the United States as a neutral,
in violation o:f the generally accepted rules of interna-
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tional la,v." (1914 U.S. Foreign Relations, Supplement
234.) Later in referring to British and French declarations as to retaliation upon neutral commerce with GerInany, the Secretary of State of the United States said
on March 5, 1915,
'Vhile it appears that the intention is to interfere \Vith and take
into custody all ships both outgoing and incoming trading with
Germany, which is in effect a blockade of German ports, the rule
of blockade, that a ship attempting to enter or leave a German
port regardless of character of its cargo may be condemned, is
not asserted.
The language of the declaration is: "the British and French
Governments will, therefore, hold themselves free to detain and
take into port ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, o·wnership, or origin. It is not intended to confiscate such
vessels or cargoes unless they \Vould otherwise be liable to condemnation."
The first sentence claims a right pertaining only to a state vf
blockade. The last sentence proposes a treatment of ships and
cargoes as if no blockade existed. The two together present a
proposed course of action previously unknown to international
law.
As a consequence neutrals have no standard by which to
Ineasure their rights or to avoid danger to their ships and cargoes. The paradoxical situation thus created should be changed
and the declaring powers ought to assert whether they rely
upon the rules governing a blockade or the rules applicable when
no blockade exists. (Ibid., HH5·, Supplement, 132.. )

lVorld lVar discussions.-On August 20, 1914, a
British Order in Council announeed that the Briti~h,
French, and Russian naval forces ·would, as affects neutral ships and commerce, conduct the war on similar principles. So far as practicable they would act in accordnnce 'vith the provisions of the Declaration of London.
In addition to exchanges in the provisions in regard to
contraband, these states made some modifications as to
destination of cargo and presumption of know ledge of
blockade. The Government of the United States had
1nacle an effort to have the Declaration of London accepted without amendment and the Central Powers had
expressed a favorable att:ttude toward this action.
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In a note of September 26, 1914, the United States
said of the Declaration of London :
As 1night be expected in a settlement of divergent views and
practices by mutual concession the Declaration of London contains provisions both advantageous and disadvantageous to the
respective interests of neutrals and belligerents. But it is now
proposed by Great Britain to retain all the provisions favorable
to belligerents and to recast other provisions so that they 'vill be
less favorable to neutral interests. The result is a set of rules
which limits neutrals' rights far more than does the declaration
itself treated as a whole. War, in any event, bears heavily upon
a neutral nation. The interruption of its commerce and the limitations placed upon its trade are sufficiently burdensome under
the rules of the Declaration of London. In consenting to those
rules the Government of the United States made great concessions
on its part and it does not feel that it can, in justice to its own
people, go further. It cannot consent to the retention of a part
of this con1pr01nise settlen1ent and to the rejection of another part.
The adoption of the declaration so modified is contrary to the
customary procedure incident to co1npr01nise settlements, to the
express provisions of the declaration itself, and to the spirit
which induced its signature. (1914 U.S. Foreign Relations,
Supplement, p. 228.)

1"he British additions and modifications greatly enlarged the Declaration of London presun1ption as to
destination and would, according to the An1erican note,
give to Great Britain "the advantages of an established
blockade 'vithout the necessity of maintaining it 'vith an
adequate naval force. The effect of this asserted right
suggests the result which was sought by the so-called
'paper blockades' which have been discredited for a
century, and 'vere repudiated by the Declaration of
Paris." (I?id, p. 229.)
In this strong note of Septe1nber 26, 1914, the United
States further says,
Finally this Government considers that the Declaration of London, as changed by the order in council, would result in such an
interference with the customary rights of neutral connnerce that
the United States could not assent to it or subn1it to its enforcement, for the reason that to recognize it as a 1neasure of the
neutra 1 rights of the United States would, in the 011inion of this
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Government, be a manifest failure on its part to safeguard the
interests of American citizens engaged in legitimate traffic with
the subjects of belligerent and neutTal nations.
In view of these considerations this Government is obliged to
inform the Government of His Britannic l\Iajesty that the United
States would be unable to accept the declaration as thus modified
though all the belligerents should concur in the modifications suggested by Great Britain. The Government of the United States,
therefore, reserves all the rights which it has under the law of
nations in relation to any losses or damages which may occur
by reason of captures or conden1nations made by the Government of Great Britain under the provisions of the Declaration of
London as 1nodified by the order in council of August 20, 1914.
(Ibid., p. 231.)

In the British note of August 22, 1914, referring to
the Order in Council of August 20, there had been the
statement,
The peculiar conditions in the pTesent war due to the fact that
neutral ports such as Rotterdam are the chief means of access
to a large part of Germany and that exceptional 1neasures have
been taken in the enemy country for the control by the GovernInent of the entire supply of foodstuffs have convinced His
l\Iajesty's Government that modifications are required in the
applications of Articles 34 and 35 of the declaration. These modifications are contained in paragraphs 3 and 5 of the accompanying order-in-council. (Ibid., p. 219.)

Paragraphs 3 and 5 here 1nentioned are as follows:
(3) The destination referred to in Article 33 [use of the armed
forces or of a government department] may be inferred from any
sufficient evidence, and (in addition to [the] presun1ption laid
down in Article 34) shall be presutned to exist if the goods are
consigned to or for an agent of the enemy state or to or for a
merchant or other person under the control of the authorities of
the enemy state. * * *
(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 35 [ship's papers
conclusive proof of voyage and port of discharge except when off
course] of the said declaration, conditional contraband, if shown
to have the destination referred to in Article 33, is liable to capture, to whatever port the vessel is bound and at whatever port
the cargo is to be discharged. (Ibid., p. 220.)

The Acting Secretary of State Lansing also said in the
note of September 26, 1914, in regard to interference with

34

CONTRABAND AND BLOCKADE

commerce to a. neutral port, such as Rotterdam, mentioned in the British memorandum,
Furthermore, if the modifications were acceptable to this Government, it would be unwilling, by accepting thein, to prejudice
the rights of the Netherlands, the other signatory of the declaration neutral in the present war, whose, interests, as the memorandum of the Foreign Office discloses, will be vitally affected by
the changes proposed. (Ibid., p. 231.)

The same matter received further consideration in an
intervie·w· between the American Ambassador and the
British Foreign Secretary.
The British purpose he went on to say was to prevent the enemy
from receiving food and materials for military use and nothing
more. I explained that the people of the United States had a
trade with Holland apart from supplies and n1aterials meant
for Germany and that our Government could not be expected to
see that sacrificed or interfered with. (Ibid., p. 233.)

Further correspondence expressed the American desire
that there should be the minimum interference ·with neutra.l commerce and that the accepted principles of international la.w should be obserYed. The British GovernInent replied to the effect that,
We [the British Government] had only two objects in our
proclamations : To restrict supplies for German army and to restrict supply to Germany of 1naterials essential for making of
munitions of 'var. 'Ve wished to attain these objects with the
minilnum of interfe·r ence with the United States and other neutral com1nerce. (Ibid., p. 237.)

After much n1ore correspondence and proposals and
counterproposals in regard to the Declaration of London, the Acting Secretary of State 'vithdrew the suggestion that the Declaration of London be a te1nporary code
of naval "\Varfare and said,
this Govenunent will insist that the rights and duties of the
United States and its citizens in the present war be defined by
the existing rules of international law and the treaties of the
United States irrespective of the provisions of the Declaration
of London ; and that this Government reserves to itself the right
to enter a protest or dem.and in each case in which those rights
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and duties so defined are violated or their free exercise interfered with by the authorities of His Britannic Majesty's Government. (Ibid, p. 258.)

The British Order in Council o:f March 11, 1915, clearly stated to be in reprisal against the German declaration
o:f the ·war zone about the United Kingdom, was considered by some as in effect a blockade, but its provisions
'vere quite unlike those establishing a blockade and involved consequences :far in excess o:f blockade liabilities. The Order in Council o:f February 16, 1917, supplemental to earlier orders gives an idea. o:f the extent
to 'vhich under reprisal measures neutrals were expected
to tolerate interference with their commerce :
1. A vessel which is encountered at sea on her way to or from
a port in any neutral country affording means of access to the
enemy territory without calling at a port in British or Allied territory shall, until the contrary is established, be dee1ned to be
carrying goods with an enemy destination, or of enemy origin,
and shall be brought in for examination and, if necessary, for
adjudication before the Prize Court.
2. Any vessel carrying goods with an ene1ny destination, or of
enemy origin, shall be liable to capture and conde1nnation in respect of the carriage of such goods; provided that, in the case
of any vessel which calls at an appointed British or Allied
port for the examination of her cargo, no sentence of condemnation shall be pronounced in respect only of the carriage of goods
of enemy origin or destination, and no such presumption as is
laid down in Article I shall arise.
3. Goods which are found on the examination of any vessel
to be goods of enen1y origin or of enemy destination shall be
liable to condemnation.
4. Nothing in this Order shall be dee1ned to affect the liability
of any vessel or goods to capture or condemnation independently
of this Order. (Statutory Rules and Orders, 1917, p. 9'53.)

As is evident neutrals were also liable under accepted
princi pies o:f international law.
None o:f the Orders in Council specifically used the
word blockade though the ai1n was to prevent communication with the enemy.
In the British men1orandu1n o:f February 20, 1915, it
was said in justification o:f their action,
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The Governrnent of Great Britain have frankly declared, in
concert with the Governn1ent of France, their intention to meet
the German attempt to stop all supplies of every kind from
leaving or entering British or French ports by themselves stopping supplies going to or from Germany for this end. The
British fleet has instituted a blockade, effectively controlling
by cruiser "cordon" all passage to and from Germany by sea.
The difference between the two policies is, however, that while
our object is the same as that of Germany, we propose to attain
it without sacrificing neutral ships or non-combatant lives or
inflicting upon neutrals the damage that n1ust be entailed 'vhen
a vessel and its cargo are sunk without notice, examination, or
trial. I must emphasize again that this measure is a natural
and necessary consequence of the unprecedented methods, repugnant to all la'v and n1orality, which have been described above,
which Germany began to adopt at the very outset of the war,
and the effects of which have been constantly accumulating.
(1915 U.S. Foreign R,elations, Supplement, p. 142.)

This act departed :from the accepted principles o:f international la 'v in regard to blockades and later correspondence does not attempt to justify the Orders in
Council on such grounds.
Proclaimed blockades in World W ar.-Blockades were
regularly proclaimed in numerous instances during the
early years o:f the "'\Vorld "'\Var.
Austria-Hungary proclaimed in 1914 "that :from August 10, at noon, the coast o:f Montenegro will be held in a
state o:f effective blockade by the Austro-Hungarian naval :forces." (1917 Naval War College, International
Law Documents, p. 53.)
The Japanese blockade o:f leased territory o:f l(iaoChau was somewhat more detailed as to hours o:f grace
:for departure o:f vessels, etc.
The successive notHications in regard to the coast of
the Cameroons show the regularity o:f certain British
procecl ure.
FoREIGN 0Fl!ICE, Ap1·il 24, 1915.
His Majesty's Government have decided to declare a blockade
of the coast of the Can1eroons as frmn n1idnigh t April 23-24.
The blockade will extend from the en tranc~ of the Akwayafe
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River to Bilnbia Creek, and fron1 the Benge mouth of the Sanaga
River to Campo.
Forty-eight hours' grace from the time of the commencen1ent
of the blockade \Vill be given for the departure of neutral vessels fron1 the blockaded area.
'Yith reference to the notification, elated April 24, 1915, which
appeared in the London Gazette of April 27 last, His lVIajesty's
Goyernment give notice that the blockade of the coast of Cameroons has l>een raised so far as concerns the coast line frmn the
Akwayafe River to Bimbia Creek. The blockade still remains in
force from the Benge mouth of the Sanaga Ri"rer to Campo.
Foreign Office, January 8, 1916.
"rith reference to the notification dated January 11, 1916, which
appeared in the London Gazette of that date, His l\lajesty's Government give notice that the blockade of the coast of the Cameroons, which had been maintained in force fr01n the Benge mouth
of the Sanaga River to Can1po, is completely raised as from midnight (Greenwich time), February 29-l\1arch 1. (Ibid., p. 135.)

1,he French notification of the blockade of Greece
gives a detailed staten1ent.
The Government of the French Republic, having agreed with its
allies to declare a blockade of Greece, hereby gives notice of the
conditions by which they will proceed.
The blockade is declared effective fron1 December 8, 1916, at 8
o'clock in the nwrning.
The blockade extends to the coasts of Greece and comprises the
islands of Eubee, Zarite, and Sainte-1\1aure- fro1n a point situated
at 39°20' north, 20°20' east of Greenwich, to a point situated
39°50' north, 22°50' east of Greenwich, as well as the islands
actually under the dependence or the occupation of the Royal
Hellenic authorities.
Vessels of third po\vers finding themselves in blockaded ports
can freely depart until December 10 at 8 o'clock in the morning.
The order has been given to the commander in chief of the
blockading forces to proceed in1mediately to notify the local
authorities of the present declaration.
Paris, Decen1ber 7, 1916. (Ibid., p. 93.)

Export proldbitions and embargoes.-The extren1e
measures of the belligerents in regard to 1novement of
goods in the W oriel War led neutrals to prohibit the export of certain articles. Sometimes neutral prohibitions
\Vere resorted to in order to preYent undue depletion of
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national stocks or resources and someti1nes in order that
:foreign com1merce might not be closed by belligerent restraints. Neutral states in close proximity to belligerent
areas such as Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
and Switzerland issued lists o:f articles o:f which export
'vas prohibited. These lists varied in comprehensiveness. The lists o:f Greece and Spain "\vere short. The
list o:f s,veden was long. That o:f Switzerland enumerating more than 200 articles, e.g., "acetones" or categories, e.g., "telephone apparatus, as well as component
parts thereof, notably microphones, field cables, insulating rubber, electric batteries; electric ignition plugs :for
automobiles" (1915 Naval War College, International
La'v Topics, p. 53), was about average in number o:f
na1ned articles or categories.
The belligerents placed restrictions or embargoes upon
the export and transit o:f certain goods and blacklisted
persons or firms so that the restraints on co1nmerce becanle o:f serious consequence to many states. The Brit~
ish list was long and many firms were placed on the
blacklist. The German list contained hundreds or articles arranged under careful classifications, as: I. AniInals and animal products: (a) Living animals; (b)
meat, meat products, fish (not live); (c) milk, butter,
ani1nal :fats; (d) refuse, bristles, bones, etc. Under
each o:f the above, detailed lists were given.
In spite o:f the self-imposed restrictions o:f neutral
states, the belligerents continually added to the difficulties o:f carrying on neutral co1nmerce.
Belligerent embargoes.-(a) British. There 'vere
several orders prohibiting certain exports :fron1 Great
Britain during 1914 and 1915. These 'vere issued under
" The customs and inland revenue act, 1879 ", " The exportation o:f arms act, 1900 ", and " The custon1s exportation prohibition act, 1914." The proclamation o:f February 3, 1915, and the orders of J\1arch 2 and 18, o:f
April 15, 21, and 26, of May 6 and 20, of June 2 and
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24, and of July 8 and 19, were issued in pursuance of the
above acts. In August 1914 it 'vas deemed expedient to
consolidate the proclamation and orders and a new
proclamation to that end was made. The proclamation
named goods in three categories: (a) exportation prohibited to all destinations, (b) exportation prohibited to
other than British possessions and protectorates, and (c)
exportation prohibited to all foreign countries in Europe
and on the l\1editerranean and Black Seas other than
France, Russia (except Baltic ports), Italy, Spain, and
Portugal.
(b) Ger1nan. Under General Imperial Order of July
31, 1914, embargoes 'vere placed on exportation, transit,
and carriage of ar1ns, ammunition, po,vder, etc. A long
list of prohibited exports w·as published and to this articles 'vere added by supplementary lists. This list became sufficiently comprehensive to include floating docks,
truffles, and broccoli. No distinction ,vas made as to
destination in the German list.
It might be argued that the belligerents prohibited the
export of the articles na1ned in their lists because these
articles 'vere essential for war purposes or needed for
the war in progress. If this 'vas the case, the list issued
by one belligerent might be regarded by the other bellig(:~rent as the basis for the enun1eration of articles 'vhich
it "rould proclaim contraband and it would be difficult of
a neutral to 1naintain that these articles which the belligerent had itself declared thus essential might not be
placed in the list of contraband.
Retaliation.-During the ear_ly days of the World \iV ar 7
action not sanctioned by international law but under
Orders in Council was not held in British courts as conclusive against neutrals. In the decision in the case of
the Zarnora in 1916 it was said, however:
A prize court must, of course, deal judicially with all questions
which came before it for determination, and it would be impossible for it to act judicially if it were bound to take its orders
from one of the parties to the proceedings.

40

CONTRABAND AND BLOCKADE

In the second place, the law which the prize court was to
adn1inister was not the national, or, as it was. sometimes called,
the n1unicipal law, but the law of nations-in other words,
international law. It was worth while dwelling for a moment on
that distinction. Of course, the prize court was a n1unicipal
c ourt ancl its decrees and orders owed their validity to n1unicipal
law. The law \Vhich it enforced Inight, therefore, in one sense,
be considered a branch of tnunicipal law. Nevertheless, the dis·
tinction between n1unicipal and international law was well defined.
A court which administered municipal law was bound by and
gave effect to the law as laid down by the sovereign State \Vhich
called it into being. It need inquire only what that law _was,
but a court which administered international law must ascertain
and give effect to a law which was not laid down by any particular State, but originated in the practice and usage long observed
by civilized nations in their relations with each other or in
·express international agreement. * * *
The fact, however, that the prize courts in this country would
be bound by acts of the imperial legislature afforded no ground
tor arguing that they were bound by the executive orders of the
J{ing ·in council. * * *
An order authorizing reprisals will be conclusive as to the
facts which are recited as showing that a case for reprisals exists,
:and will have clue weight as showing what, in the opinion of
llis l\Iajesty's advisers, are the best or only 1neans of meeting
the etnergency; but this \Vill not preclude the right of any party
.aggrieved to contend, or the right of the court to hold, that
these means are unlawful, as entailing on neutrals a degree of
inconvenience unreasonable, considering all the circun1stances of
the case. (1916 A.C. 77; 1922 Naval 'Var College, International
.Law Documents, p. 126.)

"\Vhile the right of retaliation as against an ene1ny 1nay
depend upon the action of the ene1ny, the justification
·of retaliation to,vard an ene1ny does not create new
rights tor either belligerent as regard neutrals. The degree o£ retaliation as regards the offending belligei·ent
\Vill naturally depend upon the character o£ the act
against \vhich retaliatory measures are instituted. The
-contention son1etimes advanced that one belligerent 1nay
proportion his retaliatory Ineasures so as to re1nedy evils
to \vhich neutrals may have been or Inay later be subjected preslunes that this belligerent is defending or
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maintaining neutral rights which is not within the sphere

DI law:ful belligerent action and even n1ight give grounds
ior the other belligerent to claim a nonneutral relation
bet,veen its opponent and the protected neutral. There
may be a wide divergence o:f interpretation between neutrals and belligerents as to their respective rights. It
is entirely within the competence o:f a neutral to determine what action it may take. to maintain its rights and
not :for one o:f the belligerents to take upon itsel:f the
definition and defense o:f assumed neutral rights under a
plea o:f retaliation.
The neutral is, o:f course, liable to such inconvenience
.and restraint as 1na.y be incidental to the exercise o:f
proper retaliatory action aimed directly at one belliger€nt by the other, but retaliatory measures should not be
-aimed directly or indirectly at neutrals.
To argue that one belligerent may be justified in interiering with neutral rights under retaliatory measures to
-secure the comn1on good is to prejudge the merits o:f the
contest or to affir1n as usually is the case o:f each bellig~rent that its cause is the just cause.
Retaliat1:on 1neasu~res, 1914.-The German proclamation o:f February 4, 1915, declared that a:fter February
18 the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland
and the waters o:f the English Channel would be a war
zone within 'vhich all ene1ny merchant vessels 'vonld be
destroyed and within which neutral vessels expose#thmnselves to danger. The Ame.rican Secretary o:f State
viewed the act o:f Germany with " grave concern " and
·said on February 10,
It is of course not necessary to remind the German Government
that the sole right of a belligerent in dealing with neutral vessels
<On the high seas is limited to visit and search, unless a block.a de is proclaimed and effectively n1aintained, which this Government does not understand to be proposed in this case. To de·c lare or exercise a right to attack and destroy any vessel entering a prescribed area of the high seas without first certainly
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detennining its belligerent nationality and the contraband character of its cargo would be an act so unprecedented in naval
warfare tba t this Government is reluctant ro believe that tlte
Imperial GoYernment of Germany in this case contemplates it
as possible. (1915 U.S. Foreign Relations, Supplement, p. 98.)

The German E1nbassy in vVashington had on February 7 trans1nitted to the Secretary o:f State a "Melnorandum o:f the German Government concerning retaliation against Great Britain's illegal interference ·with
trade bet,veen neutrals and Germany " in 'vhich 1nention
'vas 1nade of the British disregard of the f)eclaration of
Paris and o:f the Declaration of London.
This introduction o:f the idea o:f retaliation into the
relations between the belligerents would threaten the
rights o:f neutrals. I:f the neutrals were weak, vacillating, or hesitating in n1aintaining their rights, the retaliatory acts of belligerents would n1ore and n1ore iinpinge upon neutral rights. The belligerents might even
argue that as neutral rights had been generally admitted as equable as regards belligerents and neutrals
on the supposition that they 'vould be maintained, any
:failure to 1naintain these rights as against one belligerent would be an act in :favor of that belligerent. Indeed
during the World War each belligerent protested the
:failure o:f the United Stat€s to insist upon its nentral
rights which according to the protests had been disregarded by the other belligerent.
Germany in supporting the establishing o:f the war
zone about Great Britain and Ireland and in the English
Channel, in a note o:f February 16, 1915, said,
Gern1any is to all intents and purposes cut off fr01n oversea
supplies with the toleration, tacit or protesting, of the neutrals
regardless of whether it is a question of goods which are absolute
contraband or only conditional contraband or not contraband at
all, following the law generally recognized before the outbreak of
the war. On the other band England with the indulgence of neutral governments is not only being provided with such goods as are
not contraband or merely conditional contraband, namely, food-
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stuffs, raw material, et cetet·a., although these are treated by
England when Germany is in question as absolute contraband,
but also with goods which have been regularly and unquestionably acknowledged to be absolute contraband. The German Government believe that they are obliged to point out very particularly and with the greatest emphasis, that a trade in arms exists
between American manufacturers and Germany's enemies which
is estimated at many hundred million marks.
The German Government have given due recognition to the fact
that as a matter of forn1 the exercise of rights and the toleration of 'vrong on the part of neutrals is limited by their pleasure
alone and involves no formal breach of neutrality. The Gennan
Government have not in consequence 1nade any charge of formal
breach of neutrality. The German Government can not, howeve·r,
do otherwise, especiapy in the interest of absolute clearness in
the relations between the two countries, than to emphasize that
they, in common with the public opinion in Gennany, feel themselves placed at a great disadvantage through the fact that the
neutral powers have hitherto achieved no success or only an unmeaning success in their assertion of the right to trade with
Germany, acknowledged to be legitimate by international law,
whereas they make unlimited use of their right to tolerate trade
in contraband with England and our other enemies. Conceded
that it is the formal right of neutrals not to protect their legitin1ate trade with Germany and even to allow themselves knowingly and willingly to be induced by England to restrict such
trade, it is on the other hand not less their good right, although
unfortunately not exercised, to stop trade in contraband, especially the trade in arms, with Germany's enen1ies. * * *
The German Government repeat that in the scrupulous consideration for neutrals hitherto practised by then1 they have
determined upon the measures planned only under the strongest
compulsion of national self-preservation. Should the American
Government at the eleventh hour succeed in removing, by virtue
of the weight which they have the right and ability to throw
into the scales of the fate of peoples, the reasons which have
made it the imperative duty of the German Government to take
the action indicated, should the American Government in particular find a way to bring about the observation of the Declaration of London on the part of the powers at war with Gern1any
and thereby to render possible for Ger1nany the legitimate supply
of foodstuffs and industrial raw materials, the German Government would recognize this as a service which could not be too
73500-34--4
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highly estimated in favor of more humane conduct of war and
would gladly draw the necessary conclusions from the ne\v situation thus created. (Ibid. p. 113.)

. Pages of somewhat similar correspondence brought
replies and counter replies from various neutrals and
belligerents, but little in the way of observance of the
accepted laws of mariti1ne warfare.
The armed neutralities of 1780 and 1800 as well as the
neutrality of the United States in the last decade of the
eighteenth century and others showed that some means
other than note writing might be essential to preservation of neutral rights. Switzerland took such means for
safeguarding its territorial and aerial jurisdiction from
invasion. The Nether lands extended protection also to
its maritiine jurisdiction.- The Hague Conventions, as
article 10, Convention V, 1907, recognize the possibility
that neutrals may be called upon to maintain their
rights, and this article states,
The fact of a neutral Power repelling even by force, attempts
to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act.

Sunvmary.-Modern conditions, as shown in the n1any
and lengthy communications during the World War:
have changed the ideas as to the actual conduct of war.
As to contraband, it has become increasingly difficult
to employ intelligently such categories as contraband by
nature because some article which by nature is specially
essential to the life of a population at peace 1nay be
even absolutely essential to the state forces in time of
'var. A ne'v invention or discovery during war may
transform a category of articles, which at the beginning
of the war were solely o£ use for the peaceful population, into essential war material. The list of such articles should ordinarily be determined by the belligerent
and each belligerent would normally expect that the
other might include in his contraband list any article
included in the list of the opponent. There is also evi-
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dent in modern times the influence of the unfavorable
attitude which one or more neutral states may take to·w ard a contraband list which does not bear the marks
of 1nilitary need justifying interference with neutral
goods.
There is one category of goods the exe1nption fro1n
capture of "\V hich is generally recognized. That is, articles serving exclusively for the care of the sick and
·wounded. It is ·for the mutual advantage. of both
belligerents that such supplies be abundant.
As to blockade, it may be sufficient to repeat what "\vas
said in article 18, and the con1ment upon that article, of
the Declaration of London:
The blockading forces must not bar access to the ports or to the
coasts of neutrals. (1009 Naval 'Var College, International Law
Topics, p. 53.)

\Vorld War practice and the general opinion of "\vriters
does not afford sanction to the clai1n of a right of vessels
to pass through a neutral river to a belligerent port. The
fluvial and mariti1ne navigation of a neutral state is
within the jurisdiction of that state and not subject to.
regulation by a belligerent. Outside of neutral jurisdiction the belligerent may act in aecord with the laws of
war. Belligerent forces 1nay, of course, seize outside of
neutral jurisdiction vessels having a belligerent destination or having on board goods bound for a belligerent.
Such vessels in Situation I (b) "\vould not, when brought
before a prize court, be liable for penalties under the
laws of blockade.
SOLUTION

(a) State X 1nay declare all distinction between absolute and conditional contraband abolished, but this
does not make all goods contraband nor does it give to
state X a right to treat all articles bound for Y as
contraband.
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(b) State Y may not lawfully maintain a blockade of
the ports of state X to ·which there is access only through
a navigable river of neutral state D, nor may state Y
prevent vessels from entering the river Dana, though it
may seize vessels outside neutral jurisdiction when trans·porting prohibited goods having an ulti1m ate enemy
destination.

